Temporary Shocks and Offshoring: The Role of External Economies and Firm Heterogeneity by Mitra, Devashish & Ranjan, Priya
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Economics - Faculty Scholarship Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
5-2007 
Temporary Shocks and Offshoring: The Role of External 
Economies and Firm Heterogeneity 
Devashish Mitra 
Syracuse University 
Priya Ranjan 
University of California, Irvine 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mitra, Devashish and Ranjan, Priya, "Temporary Shocks and Offshoring: The Role of External Economies 
and Firm Heterogeneity" (2007). Economics - Faculty Scholarship. 65. 
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/65 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at 
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=995490
IZA DP No. 2811
Temporary Shocks and Offshoring: The Role of
External Economies and Firm Heterogeneity
Devashish Mitra
Priya Ranjan
D
I
S
C
U
S
S
I
O
N
 P
A
P
E
R
 S
E
R
I
E
S
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
May 2007
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=995490
 
Temporary Shocks and Offshoring: 
The Role of External Economies and 
Firm Heterogeneity 
 
 
Devashish Mitra 
Syracuse University, 
NBER and IZA 
 
Priya Ranjan 
University of California, Irvine 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 2811 
May 2007 
 
 
 
 
IZA 
 
P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-180   
E-mail: iza@iza.org
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=995490 
 
An index to IZA Discussion Papers is located at: 
http://www.iza.org/publications/dps/
 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research 
disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy 
positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn 
and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and 
visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in 
all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research 
results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
available directly from the author. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=995490
IZA Discussion Paper No. 2811 
May 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Temporary Shocks and Offshoring: 
The Role of External Economies and Firm Heterogeneity*
 
We construct a model of offshoring with externalities and firm heterogeneity. Due to the 
presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent 
effects, i.e., they can permanently raise the extent of offshoring in an industry. Also, the initial 
advantage of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in 
effect, whereby late movers have a comparative disadvantage. Furthermore, the existence of 
firm heterogeneity along with externalities can help explain the dynamic process of 
offshoring, where the most productive firms offshore first and the others follow later. Finally, 
we work out some unexpected welfare implications which show that net industry profits can 
be lower in an outsourcing equilibrium than in a regime of no outsourcing. Consumer welfare 
rises, and under fairly plausible conditions this effect can offset the negative impact on 
profits. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years, we have seen many firms in developed countries move some of their production ac-
tivities to developing countries where wages and costs of production are much lower. This oﬀshoring
of production, in many cases, has taken place within the same firm that already is or becomes a
multinational. In many other cases, certain activities have been contracted out or “outsourced” to
other firms in developing countries. This phenomenon has given rise to a whole new literature in
international trade theory.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) focus on the tradeoﬀ between integration and outsourcing with-
out being explicit about oﬀshoring. In their model, vertical integration has a high cost of gover-
nance, while outsourcing involves costly search for partners with input suppliers facing a hold up
problem due to imperfect contracting. They show how the optimal organizational form depends
on the eﬃciency of search technology, distribution of bargaining power, degree of substitutability
between products etc. In another paper, Grossman and Helpman (2005) study the determinants of
the location of outsourced activity (domestic versus foreign). They show that the extent of interna-
tional outsourcing depends on the thickness of domestic and foreign markets for input suppliers, the
relative costs of searching in each market, the relative cost of customizing inputs, and the nature
of the contracting environment. Grossman and Helpman (2003) combine elements of Grossman
and Helpman (2002) and Grossman and Helpman (2005) to study the determinants of the choice
between oﬀshore outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI). Antras (2003) studies how the
choice between oﬀshore integration and oﬀshore outsourcing is aﬀected by industry characteristics.
Most importantly, he shows that the benefits of integration outweigh the benefits of outsourcing
in capital-intensive industries. Antras and Helpman (2004) expand the set of organizational forms
to four: domestic vertical integration, domestic outsourcing, oﬀshore vertical integration, and oﬀ-
shore outsourcing, and show how variations in industry characteristics aﬀect organizational choice.
Feenstra and Hanson (2005) study the determinants of plant ownership and control of inputs in a
simple model of international outsourcing with applications to processing trade in China.
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What remains unanswered is what starts this process of oﬀshore outsourcing, and thereafter
what determines its dynamics. Besides, we also need to look at the welfare implications of this
whole process for both developed and developing countries. Based on casual empiricism, we believe
that temporary shocks can trigger this process but the eﬀects of such shocks can be permanent. For
example, a few home-grown Indian IT groups, namely companies such as Wipro, TCS and Infosys,
have become powerful players in the market for oﬀshore IT services. After getting their big breaks
from the subcontracting by overloaded western firms during the Y2K software crisis at the turn of
the millennium, they are now beginning to “expand beyond core IT maintenance and support work
into helping multinationals, for instance, to roll out new software applications”(The Economist,
December 11, 2003).1 The Y2K crisis can be viewed as a temporary shock which increased the net
benefits to American firms from outsourcing, due to a shortage of programmers in the US. This led
firms to outsource to India which had a vast available pool of programmers. This outsourcing kept
increasing well after the Y2K problem became a thing of the past.
The fact that a temporary shock had a permanent eﬀect on outsourcing suggests the existence
of externalities (external economies). We believe that as more firms from the North oﬀshore their
production activities to a country in the South, productivity in such activities of workers in the
Southern country increases. The possible explanations for this increase in productivity are the
standard ones for external economies, based on labor-market pooling, knowledge spillovers and
learning by doing.2
1See also Arora and Gambardella (2004).
2See Bresnahan, Gambardella and Saxenian (2001). In their case studies of the “new silicon valleys” in India,
Israel, Ireland and China, they clearly recognize “external eﬀects among the technology firms located there” as a
central feature of their activities. NASSCOM figures show that revenue per worker in the Indian software industry
has been increasing very rapidly from $14833 in 1997 to $37242 in 2000 (Athreye, 2004), which in the presence of
increasing employment is suggestive of at least some industry-level increasing returns to scale. Arora and Gambarella
(2004), in their case study of the Indian software industry, mention the possibility of “spillovers or scale economies,
associated with agglomeration of human capital”. For survey evidence on the importance of labor-market pooling in
the Indian software industry see Balasubramaniam (2004).
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In our analysis, we incorporate these external economies.3 Northern firms choose between
oﬀshoring their input production to the South and at the other extreme, staying fully domestic.
As more firms oﬀshore, productivity of labor in this activity in the South increases. We allow firms
in the North to diﬀer in their productivity levels in converting their inputs into final output.4 The
oﬀshore outsourcing in our model is subject to incomplete contracting between the final output firm
and the input supplier as in the work of Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003 and 2005), Antras
(2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004).5’6
We find that, due to the externalities in the production of inputs, there are multiple equilibria
- a no oﬀshoring equilibrium and another with oﬀshoring by the most productive firms. Once we
introduce some simple dynamics (similar to those based on adaptive expectations), we find that an
implication of the presence of multiple equilibria is that a temporary shock can have a permanent
eﬀect, i.e. it can move the economy from a no oﬀshoring equilibrium to one with a substantial
amount of oﬀshoring, which is consistent with what we see in the case of the Indian IT industry.
The firms that oﬀshore are firms with a higher intrinsic productivity level in the production of
the final good. Due to the heterogeneity in the productivity levels of the final output firms in the
3See Eaton and Panagariya (1979), Panagariya (1980, 1981), Ethier (1982), Rodrik (1996), and Rodriguez-Clare
(1996a) for earlier trade models with external economies of scale.
4Several recent papers such as Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004),
and Melitz (2003) have explored the implications of firm heterogeneity for international trade. Further, Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) incorporate firm heterogeneity into a model with endogenous firm choice between exports
and FDI.
5We assume labor productivity in input production to be higher in the North than in the South, with the wages
lower in the latter. In this context, we refer the interested reader to Pack and Saggi (2001) for an in-depth analysis of
the implications of technology diﬀusion from a firm in the North to an input supplier in the South through outsourcing.
Furthermore, the reverse eﬀects, namely those of outsourcing from the North to the South on Northern innovation,
is analyzed by Glass and Saggi (2001). Also, see Sener and Sayek (2004).
6 In a working paper version of this paper, we also perform an analysis of the eﬀects of complementarity between
FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing (See Mitra and Ranjan, 2005). The results of that analysis are summarized later in
this paper.
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North, the first to oﬀshore are the most productive firms, followed by the next most productive
ones and so on.
We believe that the main feature of the dynamics generated by our model is the continuation
of oﬀshoring well after the temporary shock hits the economy. Figure 1 shows recent computer and
business services insourcing (exports) and outsourcing (imports) for India and Ireland.7 While in
India, things were initiated by the Y2K crisis and the dotcom bubble, in Ireland in addition certain
tax breaks given in the late nineties were responsible for the surge in the exports of business and
computer services. Figure 2 shows the movements in software exports as a share of sales for India
for the period 1993-2002. After remaining roughly constant until 1997, this share has continued to
rise.8 As we see from figures 1 and 2, the growth in these exports has not been reversed in India or
in Ireland so far even though the Y2K and the dotcom were temporary shocks, and the tax breaks
to insourcing into Ireland were very partially reversed in response to protests from other European
countries.
Next we analyze the welfare eﬀects of oﬀshoring in our model. There are diﬀerent channels
through which welfare could be aﬀected in the North and in the South. It turns out that aggregate
net industry profits (after taking into account the fixed costs incurred in oﬀshoring) in the North
are lower in the oﬀshoring regime than when no oﬀshoring takes place. While in the case of hetero-
geneous firms, the relatively more productive firms can be better oﬀ in this oﬀshoring equilibrium,
the less productive firms will be made worse oﬀ relative to where they were in the no-oﬀshoring
regime. In the homogeneous productivity case, we clearly have a prisoner’s dilemma problem since
each firm ends up being worse oﬀ in the oﬀshoring equilibrium. However, a decrease in the aggre-
7These figures are from the point of view of Ireland and India. For example, the figures on insourcing reported
for India will consist of outsourcing by the US (and other countries) to India.
8The source of the data for this figure is Arora and Gambardella (2005). While Figure 2 does not show figures for
Ireland, the interested reader might want to know that such a clear trend was not there for Irish exports of software.
[Again, the source is Arora and Gambardella (2005).] There was a steady rise in this share in Ireland from 1991 all
the way through 1997, a fairly large fall between 1997 and 1998, after which it remained constant until 2000 and then
there was an increase for the next two years.
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gate price index due to a fall in production costs resulting from oﬀshoring is a source of welfare
gain. The net eﬀect on the welfare of a representative agent in the North depends on the relative
strengths of these opposing eﬀects. It is positive when the fixed costs of oﬀshoring are small, or the
South has a relatively much lower labor cost than in the North. The Southern consumers also gain
from the lower price of the final non-numeraire goods. In addition, the specialized input producers
in the South get a share of the surplus which is an additional source of gain for the South. In
general, the greater the amount of oﬀshoring the greater the gains to the South.
Finally, it is important to mention the paper by Markusen and Venables (1999) that is related
to our work in that they develop an analytical framework to examine how an FDI project aﬀects
local firms in the same industry through backward linkages that strengthen supplier firms.9’ 10
Our paper diﬀers substantially from the Markusen-Venables paper in that we do not explicitly
model linkage eﬀects like they do. However, while they focus on FDI, we look mainly at oﬀshore
outsourcing (with incomplete contracting between the Northern final output and Southern input
firms). Moreover, while the focus of the eﬀects of FDI in Markusen and Venables is exclusively on the
host country, the home country plays an important role in our analysis. Additionally, we incorporate
firm heterogeneity, which they do not. This firm heterogeneity, based on productivity diﬀerences, in
conjunction with external economies can generate our dynamics in which firms oﬀshore in decreasing
order of productivity. The only other paper, to our knowledge, that has looked at agglomeration
economies in the context of heterogeneous firms is a recent paper by Baldwin and Okubo (2005).
They integrate a standard Melitz-type model of monopolistic competition with a “new economic
geography” model, and show that the more productive firms locate in the bigger regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section , we set up the basic model
9 In a recent paper, Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) find stronger linkage eﬀects created by foreign firms than
domestic ones in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.
10 In this context, it is also appropriate to mention the important contribution of Rodriguez-Clare (1996b) who
works out conditions under which multinationals have favorable linkage eﬀects and those under which they create
enclave economies in developing countries.
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where firms have a choice between producing an essential input domestically or procuring it from
abroad. We capture oﬀshore outsourcing (with contracting costs) using an incomplete contracts
framework. In section 3. we derive some dynamic implications of the model. Section 4 derives
welfare implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumption
Let us assume the following utility function for a representative consumer in both the North and
the South:
U =
σ
σ − 1 ln
⎡
⎣
Z
i∈Ω
d(i)
σ−1
σ di
⎤
⎦+ xN , σ > 1 (1)
where d(i) is the consumption of the non-numeraire good i and xN is the consumption of the
numeraire good. The measure of set Ω represents the mass of available non-numeraire goods which
we assume to be fixed. Assuming that each individual in the North and South has income of at
least 1 which allows him/her to consume all the diﬀerentiated goods, the utility function in (1)
implies the following demand function for good i by an individual consumer.
d(i) =
p(i)−σZ
j∈Ω
p(j)1−σdj
(2)
We use superscript N to denote North and S to denote South and assume that the number of
consumers in the North and South are HN and HS , respectively. We use the following definitions
in rest of the paper.
Definitions : H ≡ HN +HS , A ≡
⎡
⎢⎣
Z
j∈Ω
p(j)1−σdj
⎤
⎥⎦
−1
, A0 ≡ AH.
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In the absence of any trading costs facing diﬀerentiated goods11, the aggregate demand for
good-i can be written as
x(i) = A0p(i)−σ (3)
The inverse demand function facing each firm can be written as
p(i) =
∙
x(i)
A0
¸−1/σ
(4)
Also, note that the expressions for the welfare of the representative consumers in the North and
South are given by
V N =
1
1− σ lnA+ I
N − 1 (5)
V S =
1
1− σ lnA+ I
S − 1 (6)
where IN and IS are the incomes of the representative individuals in the North and South, respec-
tively. Therefore, welfare is inversely related to A.
2.2 Production
Suppose that one unit of labor can produce wN units of the numeraire good in the North. Therefore,
the wage rate there is fixed at wN in equilibrium.
We use α to denote the productivity of a firm where α ∈ [α, α]. The distribution function of
firm productivities is denoted by G(α). Let us assume that for each of the non-numeraire goods
above, one unit of a specialized input, y, produces α units of the final good. Thus α may reflect
the quality of management in that firm. We represent this relationship by the following production
function:
x(α) = αy (7)
11We have verified that introducing trading cost for diﬀerentiated goods does not aﬀect the qualitative results in
the paper. The results are available upon request. To conserve space, we report results with no trading costs.
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While the final output of any non-numeraire good can only be produced in the North, the specialized
input can either be produced domestically in the North or its production can be outsourced to a
producer in a foreign country called the South. We do not explicitly model contract incompleteness
associated with input production that is done in the North.12 We assume that one unit of home labor
can make one unit of the input. Therefore, the cost of producing one unit of the input domestically
is wN . The unit cost of non-numeraire good, when the input is produced domestically, for a firm
with productivity α is
c(α) =
wN
α
(8)
Therefore, the objective function of a firm, that produces the specialized input domestically, is
given by
πD(α) = p(α)x(α)−
wN x(α)
α
= (A0)1/σx(α)
σ−1
σ − wN x(α)
α
(9)
Maximization of this objective function with respect to x(α) gives us
x(α) = A0
µ
σ − 1
σ
¶σ
ασw−σN (10)
The equilibrium price of the output under domestic production of the input can then be given as
pD(α) =
σwN
α(σ − 1) (11)
12Eﬀectively, we do not distinguish between transactions inside a Northern firm (vertical integration) and those
outside its boundaries but still within the North (domestic outsourcing). Relatively speaking, the problem of in-
completeness of contracts is far more severe in the South. This makes perfect transactions in the North a useful
simplifying assumption. Under such an assumption, outsourcing and vertical integration within the North will look
exactly the same. See Antras (2005) for a similar approach and argument based on the perfect verfiability by a
third party of input quality (and hence on the perfect enforcement of quality-contingent contracts) in the North. It
is important here to note that, as explained later, outsourcing input production to the South in our model will be
subject to contract incompleteness. While oﬀshoring in this model involves outsourcing and not vertical integration,
the case of international vertical integration or FDI has also been thoroughly analyzed in a working paper version of
this paper, namely Mitra and Ranjan (2005).
8
Therefore, the maximized profit of a firm that produces the specialized input domestically, is given
by
πD(α) = A0σ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1w1−σN α
σ−1 (12)
Assume that in the South φ(0) > 1 units of labor are required to produce a unit of specialized
input when no firm has begun oﬀshoring. The labor requirement when a fraction n of firms oﬀshore
is denoted by φ(n), where φ0(n) < 0 captures the externalities in the production of inputs in the
South13. To avoid clutter, we will write φ without its argument, except when talking about the
dynamic implications of our model. Given the above definition of φ, 1/φ is the South’s productivity
relative to the North. On the other hand, we assume that the wage in the South is wS < wN because
one unit of labor in the South can produce wS units of the numeraire good. As long as φwS < wN ,
which is what we assume throughout the paper, the South has a comparative advantage in the
production of the specialized inputs.14
We now allow each firm in the North the option to outsource the production of its specialized
input to a firm in the South.15 However, there is incomplete contracting between the final goods
producer in the North and the input producer in the South who has to produce a customized input
that is of use only to the particular final good producer who placed the order. Once the input is
produced, the payment for it is determined through generalized Nash bargaining.16 We assume
that β and (1-β) are the bargaining weights for the input producer and the final goods producer
13An alternative way to model externality would be to make φ a function of the total amount of inputs produced
in the oﬀshore facilities in the South. This yields qualitatively similar results, however, the algebraic expressions are
slightly more complicated. Therefore, we decided to take the simpler route of making φ a function of the number of
firms oﬀshoring.
14However, all these inputs are not always imported by the North from the South due to the presence of the fixed
costs of oﬀshoring and the implicit costs of contract incompleteness.
15The other option stilll remains the domestic production of the input (without any frictions).
16Neither the quality of input nor the amount of resources going into the production of the input is verifiable to
third parties. Therefore, no ex-ante contracts can be written to produce inputs. The reward for input production
must be determined through ex-post bargaining.
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respectively in this bargaining game. Due to the highly customized nature of the input (that cannot
be used to produce a final product other than the one it was meant for and cannot be replaced by
another input to produce the output it was meant for), the threat point of the bargaining game is
one where the payoﬀs of both the final and intermediate goods producers equal zero. We assume
that there is a large number of potential input producers in the South and every firm in the North
that attempts to find an input producer can find one by incurring a fixed cost. Let us assume that
the total fixed cost of oﬀshore outsourcing for a final goods producer in the North is FO. This
consists of search cost, cost of writing a contract etc.
Recall from (4) that the inverse demand function facing a final good producer with productivity
α is
p(α) =
∙
x(α)
A0
¸−1/σ
=
∙
αy(α)
A0
¸−1/σ
(13)
Since the payment that is going to be made to the input producer is only βp(α)x(α), we can write
the input producer’s objective function once she has decided to provide the input as:
πI(α) = βp(α)x(α)− φwSy(α) = βA01/σ(αy(α))
σ−1
σ − φwSy(α) (14)
Maximizing this objective function with respect to y(α) gives us
y(α) = A0 (φwS)−σ (
σ
σ − 1)
−σβσασ−1 (15)
Plugging the above back into the inverse demand function, we get the equilibrium price of the final
product under outsourcing as
pO(α) =
σφwS
(σ − 1)βα (16)
The final goods producer’s total profits can now be given as
πO(α) = (1− β)p(α)x(α) = (1− β)A0 (φwS)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1)
1−σβσ−1ασ−1 (17)
Note from the above expression that the level of β that maximizes the profit of final goods producers
equals σ−1σ . Therefore, if β <
σ−1
σ it would be in the interest of the final good producer to write
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a contract committing to give the input producer a share β = σ−1σ of the revenue. Thus, in the
analysis below we restrict our attention to the case of β ≥ σ−1σ . Formally,
Restriction 1 : β ≥ σ−1σ
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Homogeneous firms case
Let us first discuss the equilibrium of the model for the homogeneous firms case where productivity
α = bα for all firms. Later we will derive implications of firm heterogeneity. The expression for the
benefit from oﬀshoring, gross of fixed costs, for a representative firms is given by
πO − πD = A0σ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1bασ−1 hσ(1− β)βσ−1 (φwS)(1−σ) − w(1−σ)N i (18)
A firm oﬀshores if πO − πD > FO. To determine the equilibrium and to see the role of external
economies in this case we write the benefit from oﬀshoring for a representative firm when a fraction
n of firms oﬀshores as follows.
eB(n) = H
∙
σ(1− β)
³
φwS
β
´(1−σ)
− w(1−σ)N
¸
σ
∙∙³
φwS
β
´(1−σ)
− w(1−σ)N
¸
n+ w(1−σ)N
¸ (19)
The equilibrium fraction of firms oﬀshoring is given by a solution to the following equation.
eB(n) = FO
It is easy to verify that, for a constant φ, we get eB 0(n) < 0 from the above expression. This
captures the competitive eﬀect of oﬀshoring. As a firm moves from domestic input production to
oﬀshoring, its marginal cost of production and hence the price it charges decreases, which decreases
the aggregate price index. The profit and hence the benefit for an individual firm from oﬀshoring are
increasing in the aggregate price index. Therefore, as more and more firms oﬀshore, the benefit from
oﬀshoring for the marginal firm keeps decreasing. However, in the presence of external economies
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the negative competitive eﬀect is opposed by the positive eﬀect coming from an increase in labor
productivity in the South since Southern labor productivity is increasing in the number of firms
oﬀshoring. Because of these two opposite eﬀects the sign of eB0(n) is ambiguous in the presence of
external economies. Due to the ambiguity in the sign of eB0(n), we need to resort to simulations
to study the shape of the benefits curve. In the simulations we assume φ = be−n. The plot ofeB(n)− FO with respect to n is shown in Figure 3 where the curve labeled homogeneous is the one
for homogeneous productivity17. The benefits curve eB(n) is inverted U shaped for a wide range of
reasonable parameter values. The equation eB(n) = FO has a unique solutions in Figure 3 denoted
by n∗1. However, n
∗
1 is an unstable equilibrium. Since for n = 1 , eB(n) > FO, n = 1 is a stable
equilibrium18 In this stable, interior equilibrium all firms oﬀshore. Whether all firms oﬀshore or
only a fraction of firms oﬀshore in a stable interior equilibrium depends on parameters. However,
there is another stable equilibrium with n = 0 where no firm oﬀshores. Since the benefit from
oﬀshoring is below the fixed cost FO when no firms oﬀshore, the industry could be stuck in a zero
oﬀshoring equilibrium.
Thus, we have shown the possibility of multiple oﬀshoring equilibria in the presence of external
economies of scale. This has important policy implications. Suppose the initial situation is that
given by the curve labeled homogeneous in Figure 3 and no firms are oﬀshoring in the initial
equilibrium (n = 0). Now the industry is hit by a positive shock. The shock could either be a
17The parameters underlying Figure 3 were chosen as follows. σ = 3.8 is the same as used in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen
and Kortum (2003); the southern productivity parameter b = 1.75 which along with the Southern wage assumed to
be 40% of the Northern wage implies that the eﬀective labor cost in the South is 70% of that in the North when no
firm oﬀshores and 26% when all firms oﬀshore. This range of relative labor cost covers the range of estimates of unit
labor costs relative to the US in some countries attracting US oﬀshoring business. For example, the unit labor cost
in Mexico was 50% of the US level in 2002(van Ark et al. (2005)) while in Ireland it was approximately 45% of the
US level in 2005 (Economist, October 19th, 2006).
18Stability here is based on what happens when there is a small deviation from an equilibrium. The assumption
here is that the benefit exceeding the fixed cost (positive net benefit) leads to more firms oﬀshoring, while when the
benefit is less than the fixed cost (negative net benefit), we get a movement away from oﬀshoring.
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policy shock or a technological shock. An example of a policy shock in our setting would be a
wage subsidy by the South leading to a decrease in wS. Another type of policy shock could be a
tax break in the North which can be captured by introducing a rate of taxation of t on the profits
of Northern firms in the model. The examples of technological shock would include a decrease in
telecommunication cost reducing the trading cost of importing specialized inputs which is equivalent
to a decrease in wS or an increase in the labor productivity in the South (which would increase φ
for each n). In all these cases, the curve representing the benefit from oﬀshoring in Figure 3 will
shift up. Therefore, a small positive shock can move the industry equilibrium from one with no
oﬀshoring to one with a lot of oﬀshoring. Therefore, a small positive shock can have large eﬀects
on the volume of oﬀshoring.
The existence of multiple equilibria due to external economies also gives rise to a lock in eﬀect
of the following kind. Suppose there are two countries in the South: A and B. The firms in the
North are oﬀshoring to country A in the initial equilibrium. Now, even if another country B, with
the same β, becomes a potential source of oﬀshoring with wB < wA (but with same φ(.) function),
no Northern firm has an incentive to switch sources to B as long as φ(0)wB > φ(n∗)wA, where n∗
is the fraction of firms oﬀshoring to A in the initial equilibrium.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with heterogeneous firms
Next, we derive the implications of firm heterogeneity in the context of oﬀshoring. The expression
for the benefit from oﬀshoring, gross of fixed costs, for a firm with productivity α is given by
B(α) = πO(α)− πD(α) = A0σ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1ασ−1
h
σ(1− β)βσ−1 (φwS)(1−σ) − w(1−σ)N
i
A firm with productivity α will oﬀshore if B(α) ≥ FO. Thus, clearly if any firm with productivity
α0 decides to oﬀshore its production, it must be the case that any other firm with productivity
α00 > α0 will also oﬀshore. Suppose αO is the cutoﬀ level of productivity such that firms with
α ≥ αO oﬀshore. As mentioned earlier, we denote the distribution function of α by G(α). Now, the
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benefit of a firm with productivity α from oﬀshoring can be written as
B(α, αO) =
Hασ−1
∙
σ(1− β)
³
φ(1−G(αO))wS
β
´(1−σ)
− w(1−σ)N
¸
σ
⎡
⎣
³
φ(1−G(αV ))wS
β
´(1−σ) αZ
αO
ασ−1dG(α) + w(1−σ)N
αOZ
α
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
(20a)
The equilibrium level of αO is obtained as a solution to the following equation:
B(αO, αO) ≡ eB(αO) = FO
It is easy to verify that eB(αO) is non monotonic in αO. Therefore, the possibility of multi-
ple equilibria exists with firm heterogeneity as well. To simplify the analysis in the case of firm
heterogeneity, we make a specific distributional assumption on α in the rest of the paper.
Let us index firms by i where i ∈ [0, 1] and arrange them in decreasing order of productivity.
We assume the distribution of firm productivities to be uniform U [α, α] so that
α(i) = α− λi (21)
where λ ≡ α−α, α(0) = α and α(1) = α.With this distributional assumption, the fraction of firms
with productivity above α(n) is exactly equal to n. If n firms end up outsourcing their production,
they must be the n most productive firms (the n firms with the highest α’s). Now, the nth firm’s
benefit from outsourcing when the first n firms have outsourced is given by
B(n, n) =
Hα(n)σ−1
∙
σ(1− β)
³
φwS
β
´(1−σ)
− w1−σN
¸
σ
⎡
⎣
³
φwS
β
´(1−σ) nZ
0
α(j)σ−1dj +w1−σN
1Z
n
α(j)σ−1dj
⎤
⎦
(22)
Numerical simulations using uniform distribution show an inverted U-shape for the net benefit from
outsourcing. An implication of firm heterogeneity is that an increase in heterogeneity makes no
oﬀshoring equilibrium less likely. To see this, start with an industry with homogeneous firms which
14
is stuck in a no oﬀshoring equilibrium. Now, an increase in heterogeneity (mean-preserving spread)
implies that it is likely that some high productivity firms will find it profitable to oﬀshore even when
no other firms in the industry are oﬀshoring. Once a handful of firms oﬀshore, it will have a cascade
eﬀect leading to an equilibrium with a lot of oﬀshoring. Therefore, ceteris paribus, industries with
high degree of firm heterogeneity are less likely to be stuck in a no oﬀshoring equilibrium. This
result is verified in Figure 3 where the curve labeled heterogeneous is the plot of eB(n) − FO for
heterogeneous productivity with other parameters held the same as in the case of the curve with
homogeneous productivity19. There is a unique stable interior equilibrium in the heterogeneous
productivity case with a fraction 0.53 of most productive firms oﬀshoring, while multiple equilibria
obtain in the case of homogeneous productivity.
We can extend our model to allow for both FDI (international vertical integration) and oﬀshore
outsourcing. When we allow firms the option of both FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing, numerical
simulations provide some interesting results. In particular, FDI by some firms may facilitate out-
sourcing by others. The assumption here is that the productivity of Southern workers involved
in oﬀshored (outsourced or through vertical integration) activity is increasing in the proportion
of Northern firms oﬀshoring by either mode (outsourcing or FDI). We allow contracting issues to
aﬀect outsourcing but not FDI or international vertical integration.20 We assume that the fixed
cost FV of FDI is greater than the fixed cost of outsourcing, FO. For any given configuration of
firms doing FDI, oﬀshore outsourcing, and domestic sourcing, firm i chooses the organizational
form that maximizes its profit net of fixed costs.
We are able to analyze the consequences of complementarity between FDI and outsourcing as
19Under heterogeneous productivity, this shape can be obtained under fairly general distributional assumptions
on productivity. For example, when the productivity is assumed to be uniform over [0, α], the shape of the net
benefit curve is completely independent of α (and therefore is also completely independent of the mean and standard
deviation of productivity).
20This should be treated as a simplification of the more realistic case where contracting issues are important for
both (e.g. Antras and Helpman (2004)), however, the incompleteness of contracts aﬀects outsourcing more than
vertical integration.
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follows. Suppose initially the possibility of FDI does not exist, say due to an explicit restriction by
the host country, however, outsourcing is permitted. Due to the existence of multiple equilibria,
the industry may be trapped in a zero outsourcing equilibrium. Now, if FDI is allowed and some
high productivity firms find it individually optimal to do FDI even if no other firms do FDI,
then we get an equilibrium where some high productivity firms are doing FDI while others that
are somewhat less productive are doing outsourcing. The possibility of FDI, through external
economies generated, makes a substantial amount of oﬀshoring feasible21. An example of this kind
of phenomenon would be the setting up of captive BPO units by several multinationals in India
in the early 1990s, e.g. British airways, General Electric etc. which spurred the development of
domestic firms like Daksh, ICICI one source, etc. which provide outsourcing services to foreign
firms in arm’s length transaction.22
Introducing some rudimentary dynamics in the model with heterogeneous firms generates some
additional implications which are consistent with empirical evidence. Next we turn our attention
to the dynamic implications of the model.
21See our working paper version Mitra and Ranjan (2005) for numerical examples showing this pattern.
22The business of shifting back-oﬃce functions oﬀshore began in earnest in the early 1990s when companies such as
American Express, British Airways, General Electric, and Swissair set up their own “captive” outsourcing operations
in India (Economist, Dec 11, 2003). This “captive” outsourcing is nothing but FDI. In other words, each of these
firms set up a wholly owned subsidiary to get their back-oﬃce functions done in India. This FDI was followed by the
emergence of the provision of these services at arm’s length by domestic Indian firms. Additionally, if we look at the
type of MNCs that have captive units (for IT enabled services) in India we find that they tend to be the larger (more
productive) firms in their respective sectors. Examples of large firms engaging in FDI in India are the following:
(1) Banking and Finance - Fidelity, JP Morgan, Bank of America, American Express, HSBC, Standard Chartered
Bank, ABN AMRO, Goldman Sachs, Prudential, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Lloyd TSB, Lehman brothers. (2)
Technology and Telecom - HP, IBM, Dell, Samsung, Honeywell. (3) Automotive and Heavy Machinery: - GM, Ford,
Daimler-Chrysler, Hyundai, Caterpillar, Bechtel. (4) Pharmaceuticals/Biotech and Healthcare - Visionhealth source,
Eli Lilly, Astra Zeneca, Pfizer.(Source: NASSCOM). For evidence on the complementarity between FDI and oﬀshore
outsourcing, we refer the interested reader to the case study by Athreye (2002) on the role of multinational firms in
the evolution of the Indian software industry.
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3 Dynamic Implications
To analyze the dynamic implications we return to the case of oﬀshore outsourcing. In order to
study the dynamic response of firms to a shock, we assume that a firm makes its decision regarding
oﬀshoring on the basis of foreign labor productivity, 1/φ, in the last period (previous to the present
period) which in turn depends on the number of firms that had outsourced by the end of the
previous period as follows.
φt = φ(nt−1) = be
−nt−1
where the last equality follows from our specific functional form.23 We focus here on the heteroge-
neous productivity case, since only then do we have something to say about the sequence in which
diﬀerent firms oﬀshore.
Now, suppose the initial situation is that given by figure 4 and no firms are outsourcing in
the initial equilibrium (n = 0). Now the industry is hit by a positive shock which could be either
policy induced or technological. This shifts the benefit from outsourcing curve up. Now, some
high productivity firms find it profitable to outsource even if they do not expect any other firm
to outsource. The downward sloping dotted lines plotted in figure 4 are the benefit curves drawn
for given levels of foreign labor productivity (the productivity based on the number of firms that
outsourced by the end of the last period) given as follows.
B(n, nt−1) =
Hα(n)σ−1[σ(1− β)
³
φ(nt−1)wS
β
´(1−σ)
−w1−σN ]³
φ(nt−1)wS
β
´(1−σ) ntZ
0
α(j)σ−1dj + w1−σN
1Z
n
α(j)σ−1dj
It is easy to verify that the above is decreasing in n for a given nt−1. The first dotted line shows
benefits from outsourcing for diﬀerent firms, in decreasing order of their productivity, but under
the labor productivity corresponding to no outsourcing, i.e n0 = 0. Similarly, the second dotted
23Dynamics similar to those we generate can also result from other kinds of frictions, such as adjustment costs that
are convex in the number of firms that start oﬀshoring every period.
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line is drawn under the assumption that labor productivity in the South equals the level seen under
n1 firms outsourcing, where n1 is the fraction of firms obtained from the intersection of the FO
curve and the first downward sloping dotted line. It is important to note that even in this dynamic
context FO is not a sunk cost but a fixed cost, that is incurred every period. Algebraically then,
for a given nt−1, nt in each period is obtained as a solution to the following equation.
Hα(nt)σ−1[σ(1− β)
³
φ(nt−1)wS
β
´(1−σ)
− w1−σN ]³
φ(nt−1)wS
β
´(1−σ) nZ
0
α(j)σ−1dj + w1−σN
1Z
n
α(j)σ−1dj
= FO
This way we will reach the new long-run equilibrium where n∗ firms outsource. In this dynamic
process of convergence to this new, outsourcing equilibrium, it is interesting to note that initially,
a small number of the most productive firms outsource. This triggers outsourcing by a larger and
larger number of less productive firms. The process then ends with smaller and smaller number
of relatively less productive firms outsourcing until we reach our new steady state equilibrium
where the n∗ most productive firms have outsourced. Therefore, a small shock can take the in-
dustry/economy from a no outsourcing equilibrium to one with a large amount of outsourcing.
Note that due to multiple equilibria a small shock will have a large eﬀect even in the case with no
heterogeneity in productivity. The diﬀerence in the heterogeneous productivity case comes from
the fact that the timing of the outsourcing decision is correlated with firm productivity. That is
more productive firms outsource first, while others follow later. This is an empirical prediction
of the model which can be tested using data. Therefore, firm heterogeneity gives a deterministic
sequential process of outsourcing within an industry. As mentioned earlier, case study evidence is
consistent with this dynamic pattern of outsourcing.
Next we explore the dynamic implications of a temporary shock. In this case, there is a tem-
porary shift in the benefit from outsourcing shown in figure 5. In the figure the shock lasts for 3
periods. Again the sequence of dynamics, starting from the most productive and ending with the
least productive, is the same. Such temporary shocks can move us from the no-outsourcing equilib-
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rium to the outsourcing equilibrium. In other words, these dynamics show that while outsourcing
can be brought about by tax breaks and subsidies, it cannot be reversed by reversing these policies.
Thus temporary policies can have permanent eﬀects in our model.
As mentioned in the introduction, an example of a temporary shock would be the Y2K problem
which led a lot of firms to outsource their IT related jobs to India. The amount of IT related jobs
outsourced to India kept increasing well after the Y2K problem became a thing of the past.
4 Welfare Implications of Oﬀshore Outsourcing
Recall from (5) that a Northern representative agent’s indirect utility function is V N = 11−σ lnA+
IN − 1. In other words, welfare of this agent is decreasing in A (since σ > 1), where A is the price
index of the diﬀerentiated goods. Also, it is increasing in her income IN . Using ANO and AO to
denote the price indexes in the no oﬀshoring and oﬀshoring case, respectively, it can be shown that
ANO
AO
=
(φ(n∗)wS/β)
(1−σ)
n∗Z
0
α(j)σ−1dj + (wN )
(1−σ)
1Z
n∗
α(j)σ−1dj
(wN )
(1−σ)
1Z
0
α(j)σ−1dj
(23)
Next, from (18) in order for a firm to prefer outsourcing over domestic sourcing the following must
be true:
σ(1− β)
µ
φwS
β
¶(1−σ)
> w1−σN (24)
which in turn, in the presence of Restriction 1 (β = σ−1σ ) implies
³
φwS
β
´
< wN . Thus, from (23),
the aggregate price index is lower in an outsourcing equilibrium compared to the no oﬀshoring
case: AO < ANO. The next determinant of welfare is income IN which is the sum of wage
income and profits. Denote the total amount of labor in the North by LN . Wage income wNL
N
HN of
a representative individual remains unchanged when we move from domestic sourcing to oﬀshore
outsourcing, while her profits change. Using (12) into which we plug in the value of A0 in terms
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of H and unit costs, we find that Hσ is the aggregate profit in the case of no oﬀshore outsourcing
(and HσHN the representative agent’s profit). The aggregate gross profit is unchanged (β =
σ−1
σ ) or
goes down (β > σ−1σ ) in the outsourcing equilibrium compared to the no outsourcing case. This
can be verified by using equation (17) into which we plug in the value of A0 in terms of H and unit
costs. The net aggregate profit must be lower in outsourcing equilibrium because of the fixed cost
of outsourcing. Therefore, the income of the representative agent, IN , decreases upon oﬀshoring.
Thus, the net impact on welfare depends on the relative strengths of the positive eﬀect arising from
a lower aggregate price index and the negative eﬀect from a decline in income. It is easy to verify
that if the fixed cost of oﬀshoring is small or the wage in the South is small, then the welfare of
the representative agent increases in the North.
While oﬀshoring leads to a reduction in aggregate net profits, it is possible for some high
productivity Northern firms to gain. Since the firms that are unable to oﬀshore charge the same
price they would have charged when oﬀshoring was not allowed and since A0 (which is a measure
of market size for each firm) becomes smaller due to lower prices charged by oﬀshoring firms, the
fully domestic firms now make lower profits. When β = σ−1σ , since the aggregate gross profit
remains unchanged, the gross profits of some high productivity oﬀshoring firms must increase (if
every firm does not end up oﬀshoring in equilibrium). However, their profits net of the fixed costs
of oﬀshoring may or may not increase. Even among the oﬀshoring firms, there are always some (the
least productive ones) that lose and depending on parameters it is possible that there are others
(the most productive ones) that ultimately may gain from oﬀshoring.
From the case of heterogeneous firms, if we move to homogeneous firms, it is easy to see that
all firms lose in an oﬀshoring equilibrium as compared to a no-oﬀshoring equilibrium. Thus there
is a prisoner’s dilemma problem here. Also in the heterogenous case, if in equilibrium all firms end
up oﬀshoring it is easy to show that each of these firms ends up losing.
Next, it is easy to verify that the Southern welfare increases unambiguously because of two
reasons: lower prices of diﬀerentiated goods and a part of the surplus captured by the input
producing firms which didn’t exist in the no oﬀshoring case. Therefore, we conclude that while
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consumers in both the North and South gain from oﬀshoring, the impact on the net (of fixed costs)
aggregate profits of firms in the North is negative in the logarithmic utility case.
Before ending this section, it should be noted that the results on the aggregate gross profit
remaining unchanged for β = σ−1σ or decreasing for β >
σ−1
σ is a consequence of the logarithmic
utility function which fixes the total expenditure on diﬀerentiated goods to unity. In general, if
the demand for the aggregate of diﬀerentiated goods is price elastic then the total expenditure
on diﬀerentiated goods will increase after oﬀshoring leading to an increase in the aggregate gross
profit. In the opposite case of an inelastic demand, there would be a decrease in the gross aggregate
profit upon oﬀshoring. It is possible for the aggregate profit net of the fixed cost of oﬀshoring to
go down even in more general cases.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present a model of oﬀshoring in the presence of externalities and firm heterogeneity.
We show that the incorporation of externalities in a general equilibrium model of oﬀshoring yields
some interesting insights. The externalities give rise to multiple oﬀshoring equilibria. Due to the
presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent eﬀects, i.e.,
they can permanently raise the extent of oﬀshoring in an industry. Moreover, the initial advantage
of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in eﬀect, whereby late
movers have a comparative disadvantage. Also, the existence of firm heterogeneity along with
externalities can help explain the dynamic process of oﬀshoring where the most productive firms
oﬀshore first and others follow later. Furthermore, there exists the possibility of complementarity
between two modes of oﬀshoring: FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing. Finally, we work out in detail
some unexpected, but fairly intuitive, welfare implications of oﬀshoring. Consumers in both the
North and the South gain, while the profits of Northern firms can actually go down as a result of
outsourcing. The South also gains from getting a share in Northern profits upon oﬀshoring.
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Figure 1:Export and Import of Services by India and Ireland
(in billions of US dollars)
India's IT Services Exports (Source: 
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Figure 2: Indian software exports as a share of software sales
Source: Arora and Gambardella (2005)
Figure 3:Equilibria with and without firm heterogeneity
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Figure 4: Dynamics after a permanent shock 
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